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ABSTRACT       
 
This paper explores the nature of disciplinary decisions of health professional regulatory 
boards in response to commercial violations by licensees.  Decisions of the Virginia Boards of 
Dentistry, Medicine and Optometry  are analyzed to  assess the extent to which disciplinary 
decisions appear to protect the economic interests of professionals versus the health, safety and 
welfare of the public.  Sanctions imposed on commercial and non-commercial violations are 
compared.  Given the criticism that regulatory boards are more concerned with commercial 
practices rather than quality of care practices, it was expected that board disciplinary actions 
would reflect this concern.   The results indicate that there is no significant difference in the 
severity of sanctions imposed on both types of violations. Commercial violations, when 
compared with non-commercial violations, are not sanctioned more harshly by regulatory 
boards.  The implications for self-interest theories of professional regulation and policies 
governing commercial practices of health professionals are discussed. 
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ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL VIOLATIONS BY HEALTH PROFESSIONAL 
  REGULATORY BOARDS: A RESEARCH NOTE   
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article explores the nature of disciplinary decisions of health professional regulatory 
boards in response to commercial violations by licensees. Decisions of the Virginia Boards of 
Dentistry, Medicine and Optometry  are analyzed to determine the nature of sanctions imposed on 
commercial violations.  Virginia is the focus of the paper because it was one of the first states to 
evaluate systematically the enforcement function of its health professional boards.   
Health professional regulatory boards are state administrative entities responsible for 
establishing entry and performance standards and for enforcing statutes and regulations governing 
professional practice. Professionals predominate or comprise the full membership of most boards. 
Professional norms---economic, ethical and technical---codified in statutes and in board regulations 
are critical in regulatory board decisions (Bayles, 1987). 
Regulatory boards typically rely on three major types of credentialing mechanisms for 
establishing entry standards: registration; certification and licensure. The least restrictive is 
registration, which simply requires individuals to register with a state designated agency.  
Certification allows the use of a title by anyone who meets specified criteria. Certification does not 
restrict practice per se, but just restricts the use of particular titles associated with that practice.  
Licensure, the most restrictive form of regulation, refers to the exclusive authority given to 
individuals who meet specified criteria to practice a profession or occupation (Shimberg, 1982).   
Certification, registration and licensure each impose different constraints and consequences 
on their respective professional groups, with respect to the cost and quality of health care services 
(Shimberg, 1984). Licensure is the form of regulation most relevant to this analysis of disciplinary 
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decisions. The professional boards analyzed in this paper impose licensure laws and regulations on 
the relevant professional group.    
 
PROBLEM 
Licensure, the form of regulation most associated with the term regulation for practice to 
those with the required qualifications to practice. A major criticism is that the monopoly afforded by 
licensure requirements increases costs with little improvement in the quality of health care service 
(Gaumer, 1984; Hogan, 1983).  In reviewing 97 studies on health professional regulations, Gaumer 
concluded that easing licensure restrictions would reduce costs without endangering public safety 
(Gaumer, 1984). Some observers even argue that licensure requirements are detrimental to the 
delivery of and access to health care services because such requirements decrease the number of 
practitioners. As a result, the costs of their services are higher (Carroll and Gaston, 1983; Hogan, 
1983).   
A second criticism of regulatory boards is that they overemphasize control of commercial 
practices, such as advertising, rather than patient care practices.  Regulations such as restrictions on 
advertising have been criticized for not protecting the public's health, safety or welfare.  Critics 
charge that these regulations' major purpose is to restrict competition, thereby increasing the income 
of licensed professionals (Cohen, 1980).  
Are these criticisms of regulatory boards warranted? Are boards more interested in protecting 
the economic interests of their colleagues than in protecting the health and safety of consumers?  
This study attempts to answer these questions by analyzing regulatory boards' enforcement of 
commercial practice restrictions.  Health professional regulatory boards' disciplinary decisions are 
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made in response to commercial violations are examined.    
This study is significant for several reasons. First, empirical data on regulatory board 
discipline has only recently been made available for analysis.  Thus, there are few empirical studies 
on disciplinary actions by regulatory boards. The results will provide empirical evidence to either 
support or challenge the long-standing critique of regulatory boards with respect to disciplinary 
decisions concerning commercial restrictions.  
Second, this study's focus on one state and several boards provides a comparative basis to 
analyze disciplinary outcomes of regulatory boards in other states.  Thirdly, in addition to medicine, 
this study includes dentistry and optometry, which have received almost no empirical study of their 
disciplinary decisions. Finally, although considerable research has been done on the relationship 
between licensure and commercial practices, a similar effort has not been directed toward an 
empirical examination of the enforcement of commercial practice restrictions (for example, see 
Begun, 1981; Gross, 1984). 
 
OVERVIEW OF HEALTH PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE IN VIRGINIA        
The administrative home of the boards is the Virginia Department of Health Professions, 
which the Department provides administrative support for the regulatory function of the boards.  The 
boards have the sole authority and responsibility for licensing, regulating and disciplining licensed 
health professionals in Virginia.  Complaints investigated by the Department are forwarded to each 
board to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegation of a violation.  If the 
boards determine there is sufficient evidence, they will conclude that a violation of a statute or 
regulation has occurred and impose a sanction.  If the evidence is deemed insufficient, the complaint 
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is dismissed.  Consequently, considerably more complaints are received and investigated by the 
department than the resulting number of violations and sanctions. 
State statutes provide general authority to all professional and occupational boards in order to 
regulate and discipline practitioners; the statutes grant boards the authority to act to protect the 
public.  This general authority is supplemented by specific statutes and regulations for each 
respective board.  The general powers and duties of all health professional boards include the 
authority to: (1) revoke, suspend, restrict or refuse to issue or renew a registration, certification or 
license which such board has authority to issue for causes enumerated in applicable law and 
regulations, and; (2) take appropriate disciplinary action for violations of applicable law and 
regulations (VA. CODE ANN. '54.1-2400, 1984).   
The authority to discipline practitioners is further defined in each board's statutes and 
regulations. The penalties boards may impose for violations of statutes or regulations include 
monetary penalties as well as restrictions on the right to practice. The boards in Virginia are 
authorized to impose monetary penalties of up to $1,000 provided the licensee does not face criminal 
prosecution (VA. CODE ANN. ' 54.1-2401).  In addition, criminal penalties maay be imposed if 
violations of statutes or regulations of Title 54 are Class 1 misdemeanors and are repeated violations 
(three or more within 36 months), they constitute a Class 6 felony. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The conceptual framework is derived from self-interest theories of professional regulation.  
Within this theoretical formulation, professionals dominate regulatory inputs and outcomes by 
"capturing" the regulatory mechanisms (Meier, 1985).  Most professional regulatory boards for 
  7 
example, are composed solely of professionals.  The few states which allow non-professionals to sit 
on regulatory boards typically prevent them from voting on licensure or disciplinary matters. 
Professionals may impose restrictions on entry into the profession, and impose other ethical 
obligations which limit competition. 
If boards are dominated by the regulated professions and if the regulated professions adopt 
monopolistic policies and practices, then we would typically expect discipline to further complement 
such policies and practices.  Within the regulatory sub-system, the boards function in isolation from 
other factors--such as consumer advocacy--which might serve to mitigate the tendency to protect the 
interests of the profession.  Protecting the interest of the profession, however, does not necessarily 
conflict with protecting the interests of the public and the consumer.  Therefore, we might find that 
even though regulatory board actions further practitioners' interests, the public and consumers' 
interests are adequately protected. 
  The analysis of disciplinary decisions builds on one of the first studies to examine 
disciplinary decisions at the state level---Schneider's 1987 study "Influences on State Professional 
Licensure Policy." Schneider's disciplinary categories of "strong" and "weak" were broadened to 
include three major types of discipline available to regulatory boards: punitive, rehabilitative and 
symbolic.  These categories reflect both the degree of severity of sanctions as well as the approaches 
to discipline that boards may take. 
1. Symbolic sanctions indicate deviation from acceptable board standards, but do not limit 
the right to practice.  Examples include letters of warning, reprimands and cease and desist orders. 
2. Rehabilitative sanctions are measures designed to improve the practitioner's capability for 
safe practice, and include measures such as a continuing education requirement, special supervision 
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for a specified period of time or referral to substance abuse counseling.   
3. Punitive sanctions limit the practitioner's freedom to practice.  Included in this category 
are license suspensions, license revocations and financial penalties.   
The data analyzed were collected by the Virginia Department of Health Professions for their 
Complaint Tracking and Reporting System.  Complaints of alleged violations are entered into this 
system and tracked through the investigative and adjudicative phases of complaint resolution.  
Descriptive statistics of complaints, violations and board findings were generated using the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).  The following hypothesis was tested using chi-
square analysis and lambda: 
Health professional regulatory boards are more likely to apply punitive sanctions to 
commercial violations than non-commercial violations. 
 
This hypothesis tests the extent to which trade restriction violations differ significantly from 
other types of violations, in terms of sanctions imposed by the boards. The results will provide the 
empirical evidence to support the claim that professional regulatory boards appear to give a higher 
priority to protecting professionals' economic interests than to protecting the public's health, safety 
and welfare. 
 
RESULTS   
The results fail to support the hypothesized relationship between the commercial violations 
and punitive sanctions.  The severity of disciplinary actions is commensurate with the seriousness of 
commercial practices violations.  Thus, there is little empirical evidence that regulatory boards are 
unduly harsh in responding to commercial violations compared to other types of violations. 
In general terms, regulatory boards were found to impose similar sanctions on commercial 
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and non-commercial violations.  There is no significant difference in the nature of sanctions 
imposed, regardless of the severity of the violation. Regulatory boards appear to mete out 
appropriate punishment for commercial violations, given the severity of such violations. The least 
serious violations receive the least severe sanctions. 
 
Commercial Complaints Received 
Sources such as licensees, consumers and professional organizations generated 220 
complaints. After reviewing a complaint and the evidence, the boards determine whether there is 
sufficient evidence to conclude a violation occurred. The boards received considerably more 
complaints than the number of violations ultimately sanctioned. Of these complaints, only 21 % 
(n=42) were substantiated as actual violations. That percentage varied among boards, from a high of 
34% for the Dentistry Board to a low of 10% for the Optometry Board. 
 TABLE 1 
 COMMERCIAL COMPLAINTS RECEIVED AND ADJUDICATED AS VIOLATIONS  
 
Board 
 
Complaints  
 
Violations as % of 
Complaints  
 
 
 
  #       
 
   #      % 
 
Dentistry 
 
   62     
 
   21    34.0  
 
Medicine 
 
   81     
 
   13    16.0 
 
Optometry 
 
   77     
 
    8    10.0 
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   TOTAL   220       42    21.0 
 
 
  Although the overwhelming majority of commercial complaints are unsubstantiated by the 
evidence, the boards appear to respond appropriately in that the least serious violations are given the 
mildest penalties.  The Department's ranking of commercial complaints in terms of seriousness is 
shown in Table 2.  Each priority code represents the Department's assessment of the danger the 
alleged violation posed to the public or the consumer. Priority One represents the most serious 
violations, whereas Priority Three represents violations with no direct threat to the well being of the 
public or the consumer.  Approximately three-fourths of complaints and violations fall into the 
Priority Three category, according to Table 2.   
 TABLE 2    
 PRIORITY RANKINGS OF COMMERCIAL COMPLAINTS AND VIOLATIONS  
 DENTISTRY, MEDICINE AND OPTOMETRY  
 
Priority Rank 
 
Complaints 
 
 Violations 
 
 
 
  #     % 
 
  #    % 
 
Priority One 
 
   12    5 
 
    4   10       
 
Priority Two 
 
   50   23 
 
    6   14    
 
Priority Three 
 
  158   72   
 
   32   76 
 
     TOTAL 
 
  220  100.0            
 
   42  100.0 
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Sanctions Imposed on Commercial Violations 
The majority of sanctions imposed on commercial violations fell into the non-punitive 
category, according to Table 3. Non-punitive sanctions were applied to 80% of the commercial 
violations compared with 65% of the non-commercial violations. Overall, there is no significant 
difference in the nature of the sanctions imposed on commercial versus non-commercial violations.   
 TABLE 3 
 Type of Violation 
 
 
 
 
Commercial 
   %        # 
 
Non-Commercial 
   %        # 
 
Punitive Sanctions 
 
   20       (6) 
 
   35      (66) 
 
Non-Punitive Sanc- 
tions 
 
   80      (24) 
 
   65      (124) 
 
      TOTAL 
 
 100       (30) 
 
 100       (190) 
 
Chi-Sq.   Pr. 
 1.93     .16 
 
 
 
          N=220 
 
Individual Boards   
An examination of the results for each individual board indicates no support for the 
hypothesis.  The Board of Medicine imposed no punitive sanctions on commercial violations, but 
imposed punitive sanctions on 34% of the non-commercial violations. The chi-square value of 1.29 
with a probability of .26 and a lambda value of zero indicates the independence of these two 
variables.  Although the Board of Optometry imposed more punitive sanctions on commercial 
violations (86%) than on non-commercial violations (77%), the difference is not significant.  The 
chi-square value of .68 indicates an independent relationship between the two variables. 
An analysis of the Board of Dentistry findings, shown in Table 4, resulted in a chi-square 
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value of 5.30 with a probability of .02, suggesting that the nature of the sanction may not be 
independent of the nature of the violation.  However, the lambda value of zero supports the idea that 
knowing whether a violation is commercial versus non-commercial does not reduce the error in 
predicting the type of sanction imposed.  
 TABLE 4 
 Association Between Type of Violation and Type of Sanction for 
 Commercial Violations 
 
 
Hypothesis 
 
  Board 
 
Ind.Var.     
 
Dep.Var. 
 
 Chi-Sq. 
   Value 
 
 Lambda 
 
Hyp. #1 
 
 All 
 
 Type of a 
 Violation 
 
 Type b  
of Sanction 
 
 1.93 
 
 .00 
 
 
 
 Dentistry 
 
  Type of Violation     
 
 Type of Sanction 
 
 5.30* 
 
  .00 
 
 
 
 Medicine 
 
 Type of Violation  
 
 Type of Sanction 
 
 1.29  
 
  .00 
 
 
 
 Optometry 
 
  Type of Violation 
 
 Type of Sanction 
 
 .16 
 
  .00 
 
*p <.05  **p <.01 ***p <.001 
a Commercial Violation  b Punitive Sanction 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Commercial violations are more likely than non-commercial violations to receive non-
punitive sanctions, except in Optometry cases.  The Boards of Medicine and Dentistry both imposed 
only non-punitive sanctions on commercial violations.  Although Optometry imposed more punitive 
sanctions on commercial than non-commercial violations, there was no statistically significant 
difference in the nature of sanctions imposed on the two types of violations.  
Since three-fourths of commercial violations are categorized among the least serious 
violations (Priority 3), the boards responded appropriately by imposing milder sanctions. In this 
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instance, boards do not appear to take a punitive stance toward commercial violations.  
Given the extensive criticism of boards' preoccupation with commercial practices rather than 
quality of care practices, it was expected that board disciplinary actions would reflect this concern.  
However, the evidence here suggests there is no particular targeting of commercial violations for 
harsh punishment, at least in terms of the disciplinary decisions of the Boards of Dentistry, Medicine 
and Optometry in Virginia.  
Theoretical assumptions about boards protecting the economic interests of licensees do not 
appear to be reflected in disciplinary decisions.  Perhaps professional' economic interests are a major 
consideration for a particular profession to impose licensure and entry requirements.  However, once 
these goals are accomplished, economic considerations play a less important role in the enforcement 
of statutes and regulations governing the profession. 
An alternative explanation may be that regulatory boards are sensitized to criticisms asserting 
that boards have emphasized issues such as restrictions on competition and advertising, and have 
neglected patient-centered standards of professional practice. The diminished importance of 
economic concerns may have resulted from attacks on the anti-competitive aspects of professional 
licensure reflected in Federal Trade Commission decisions, in lawsuits against the American 
Medical Association, and in state and county medical societies. Federal anti-trust policies and 
successful anti-trust suits may have had the desired effect of discouraging sanctions of violations 
related primarily to the commercial aspects of professional practice.  As a result, commercial 
violations may no longer be punished as harshly as they may have been in the past.  
Regulations governing advertising and trade practices may not be critical factors in 
protecting the public's welfare.  All of the commercial violations dealt with by these three boards 
  14 
were classified as among the least serious threats to the public.  Furthermore, the second largest 
group of complaints dismissed were alleged commercial violations.  Board and staff time might be 
better spent exploring consumer concerns rather than investigating and adjudicating allegations of 
commercial violations.  
Health professionals, however, are unlikely to support reduced restrictions on advertising and 
trade practices. Many argue that regulation ensures high quality care delivered by the most 
competent practitioners. Such people believe that regulations such as restrictions on advertising are 
essential to protecting the consumer from misleading information about health care services 
(Galusha, 1989). 
The nature of disciplinary decisions related to commercial violations have policy and 
administrative implications for health professional regulators.  Overall, disciplinary decisions appear 
to match commercial violations apprpriately; the severity of the penalty is in line with the 
seriousness of the infraction. However, the extent to which boards should address such violations is 
still an open question.  Given the constraints of limited resources, board members and staff might be 
more effective if time, money and energy were directed toward patient-centered violations. 
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